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 This study draws attention to the proliferation of tail risks in financial markets prior to and 
during the course of the recent global financial crisis. It examines the level of tail risks in 
selected equity, interbank lending and foreign exchange markets in selected EU Member 
States in relation to the United States. The extent of tail risks is assessed by applying general 
error distribution (GED) parameterization in GARCH volatility tests of the examined 
variables. The empirical tests prove that tail risks were pronounced across all of the examined 
European financial markets throughout the crisis. They were also significant prior to the crisis 
outbreak. The analyzed interbank lending markets exhibited more extreme volatility outbursts 
than the equity and foreign exchange markets. Several countercyclical monetary and 
macroprudential policies aimed at abating tail risks are identified and discussed. Flexible 
capital adequacy and contingent capital requirements for financial institutions are advocated. 
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I.  Introduction 
 
The global financial crisis that began in mid-August 2007 has underscored the importance of 
tail risks embedded in the behaviour of key financial market variables.  The primary examined 
variables are equity market indexes, interbank lending rates and exchange rates. The 
prevalence and scale of tail risks have contributed to the unprecedented depth, propagation 
and unpredictability of this crisis (Mishkin, 2009; Orlowski, 2008b).  Ultimately, tail risks 
have engendered proliferation of systemic risk, i.e. a high probability of systemic financial 
collapse.  
 
Tail risks stem from extreme outcomes and suggest that the data distribution of 
financial market variables is not normal but leptokurtic, which indicates high concentration of 
data around the mean at normal times and wide dispersion at turbulent periods. Elevated 
volatility, or fat tails in financial data distribution impair reliability of forecasts of these 
variables, particularly at times of financial distress. Fat tails arise from investor behaviour that 
is triggered by either excessive optimism or pessimism, leading to large market moves. As 
investors purchase securities in a steady stream being encouraged by herd behaviour that is 
not supported by economic fundamentals, a period of asset price appreciation yields to 
increased volatility. Eventually, a negative signal from fundamentals triggers a sudden sell-off 
of securities, reversing the herd actions, and amplifying price volatility. In essence, this 
herding behaviour and formation of asset-price bubbles leads to uncertainty of asset valuation, 
eventually resulting in high asset-price volatility, i.e., tail risks. 
 
The analysis of tail risk conducted in this study is rooted within the context of selected 
theoretical models of financial crises, including the 'financial fragility', 'herd behaviour' and 
'asset-price bubble' models. It argues that these concepts implicate prevalence of tail risks. 
Most of the analytical models applied in risk assessment and financial forecasting, such as the 
value-at-risk models, are based on an assumption of normal (Gaussian) data distribution. By 
ignoring leptokurtosis or tail risks, these models tend to overestimate volatility at normal 
periods and underestimate it at turbulent times.   
 
This paper investigates prevalence of tail risks for the key financial variables that 
comprise market risk, i.e. equity market indexes, interbank lending rates and exchange rates 
relative to the euro. I aim to measure the extent of tail risks in equity, interbank credit and 
foreign exchange markets in the EU prior to and during the recent financial crisis. To reflect 
upon the variety of EU financial markets, the empirical analysis includes seven larger 
European countries. This group encompasses two dichotomies. The first distinguishes 
between incumbent and new EU Member States, and the second distinguishes between the 
eurozone members and the euro-candidates. Conditional volatility patterns of financial 
markets of the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Hungary, Poland, Sweden, and the United 
Kingdom are compared with those of the United States, where the crisis originated. The daily 
data series include 2540 observations for the sample period January 3, 2000-September 14, 
2009. For the purpose of ascertaining tail risks, I employ GARCH-M tests augmented with 
general error distribution (GED) parameterization. The main advantage of looking at volatility 
dynamics using the GARCH-M-GED testing is that it allows for measuring the scope of tail 
risks. The ubiquitous character of extreme tail risks is empirically detected for all examined 
EU financial markets, as well as for the U.S. markets. It stems from increasingly risky capital 
inflows that have contributed in recent years to adverse feedback loops between increasingly 
volatile asset prices and the real economy slowdown. In all examined cases, the estimated 
GED parameters indicate significant fat-tails.   3
 
  This paper contributes to the existing literature in several ways. It identifies the roots 
of tail risks within the main theories of financial crisis, it provides specific estimates of the 
magnitude of these risks in selected financial markets, and it suggests several policy solutions 
for containment of these risks.  It argues that extreme volatility of financial market variables 
is a source of systemic risk.  At times of financial distress, volatility of the analyzed financial 
variables is intensified, manifesting itself as an extreme leptokurtic distribution. Such extreme 
volatility is most pronounced in the case of interbank rates and somewhat less significant for 
equity market indexes and exchange rates, which is the main empirical finding of this paper.  
These disparities have been particularly magnified during the recent global financial crisis. 
 
Prior to this crisis, the potential for outbursts in volatility of financial market variables 
had been largely underestimated, which was a major contributing factor to the unexpected 
scale of this crisis. Therefore, monitoring tail risks has emerged as a prerequisite for devising 
appropriate monetary and macroprudential policies aimed at containing speculation and 
mitigating systemic risk. In general, policies aimed at mitigating extreme risks ought to be 
countercyclical and sufficiently flexible, allowing for appropriate responses during tranquil 
market periods as well as at times of financial distress. 
 
  Section II discusses basic theoretical concepts that explain the recent crisis within the 
context of tail risk proliferation of key monetary and financial variables. Section III explains 
the impact of several risk categories faced by financial institutions and monetary policy-
makers on systemic risk. An empirical approach to tail risk analysis is laid out in Section IV. 
Empirical tests demonstrating the impact of the recent crisis on volatility of equity market 
indexes are presented and discussed in Section V. Volatility of interbank interest rates is 
analyzed in Section VI and of exchange rates in Section VII.  Monetary and macroprudential 
policy responses aimed at mitigating tail risks within a broader policy framework for 
managing systemic risk are outlined in Section VIII. Section IX summarizes the main 
arguments and findings. 
 
 
II.  Tail Risks in Financial Crisis Theories  
 
The depth and the global scope of the recent financial crisis has taken the majority of 
economists and financial analysts by surprise, because the prevailing risk assessment and 
forecasting models were based on the assumption of normal data distribution. These models 
have proven to be flawed because they disregard the potential for leptokurtic distributions 
among financial variables.  
 
Although a comprehensive theoretical framework for analyzing financial crises is yet 
to be developed, a number of existing theories of financial fragility and crises could have been 
used to identify the potential for tail risks. Chief among them is the Kindleberger-Minsky 
theoretical framework of financial fragility, which they consider an inherent attribute of 
market economies. According to Minsky (1982a, 1982b), high financial fragility leads to a 
higher risk of financial crisis. When there are first signs of the so-called 'Minsky moment', 
which is an abrupt reversal of investor confidence, appropriate economic policy decisions are 
needed to avoid the transition from “normal” to high fragility (i.e. to a debt-deflation process). 
At these times, the intensity of decline depends on the relative proportion of three categories 
of financing identified by Minsky, i.e. hedge finance, speculative finance and Ponzi finance.  
The most stabilizing among them is hedge finance, in which both the principal and interest   4
payments on loans are paid in every period. With speculative finance, income flows cover 
interest payments only, forcing a borrower to roll over at least some portion of debt. The most 
destabilizing is Ponzi finance, which takes place when expected income is not sufficient to 
cover interest costs, forcing the borrower to incur more loans or to sell off assets to service the 
debt.  
 
  A key trigger of the crisis outburst in the Minsky-Kindleberger theoretical framework 
(Minsky, 1982a, 1982b; Kindleberger, 1988, 1996) is an exogenous shock to the 
macroeconomic system, labelled by Minsky as a ‘displacement’. Such a shock can be induced 
by various types of systemic interruptions (wars, supply or demand shocks, drastic regulatory 
changes or other ‘policy-switching causes inducing financial instability). One such cause that 
is particularly relevant to the recent global financial crisis is the expansion of bank credit to 
increasingly risky borrowers, which was incited by the rapid growth of credit derivatives. As 
argued by Minsky (1982a), an expansion of bank credit usually follows an economic boom. 
Such expansion enlarges money supply and leads gradually to a speculative mania that 
accompanies infinitely growing personal credit. This in turn spurs the development of new 
credit instruments and a further expansion of personal credit outside the banking sector. Such 
growth in liquid funds engenders supply of both traditional and new types of financial assets 
that generate strong profits for investors. Solid profits trigger further demand for financial 
assets in spite of rising assets prices, which results in a ‘bandwagon effect’ that becomes 
increasingly speculative as less-qualified and more risky investors join the game.  This 
process ultimately leads to the formation of an asset-price bubble.  Such speculative 
‘euphoria’ (as it is called by Minsky), or ‘over-trading’ (as termed by Adam Smith) leads to a 
situation of ‘revulsion’ when economic agents realize that markets cannot go higher any 
more.  At this stage, a single exogenous shock is all that it takes to trigger a stampede, a burst 
of a speculative bubble. In the Minsky-Kindelberger conceptual framework, relative stability 
or ‘tranquillity’ is restored if one or more of the following conditions take place: (a) investors 
move to less liquid assets, (b) trade is constrained by limits on price declines, or, perhaps most 
importantly, (c) the lender-of-last-resort provides sufficient liquidity to financial markets 
(Kindleberger, 1996). In sum, the Minsky-Kindleberger model is useful for understanding 
both the creation of a speculative bubble and the prevalence of leptokurtosis in the time series 
of asset prices.  During the bubble-growing period, asset price volatility is likely to be 
contained around the mean. However, during the crisis period asset-prices are subject to 
significant, unexpected gyrations.  
 
 Investor  herd behaviour is a second plausible factor contributing to the asset price 
bubble cycle. In integrated financial markets, information flow is fast and unrestrained, 
allowing investors to learn from each other and form expectations about future asset-price 
trends.  Herding models assume that investors are acting rationally by following their peers as 
they buy certain types of assets, presumably because the other players have some additional, 
yet to be disclosed positive information about these assets.  However, in the framework of 
'adaptive learning' models, investors are imperfectly rational, as their buying decisions are 
based on presumed information of others that asset prices will rise further (Froot, et.al 1992). 
In some extreme cases when asset prices are proven to rise for some time, investors following 
the 'herd' buying decisions may develop a perception that the price increase is more 
permanent and a price correction is unlikely.  This leads directly to a formation of asset price 
bubbles. Such perceptions and the herd behaviour related to them are particularly pervasive 
when full information about asset prices is restricted and not widely available. This 
phenomenon has been confirmed in several recent studies. Among them, Cipriani/Guarino 
(2009) demonstrate that herding behaviour of investors prevails under the market scenario   5
with a high event (price) uncertainty, while the proportion of herd decisions is low in the 
absence of similar uncertainty. Nevertheless, recent herding behaviour models have also been 
exposed to some criticism. They have been viewed as ineffective for explaining financial 
crisis episodes if they assume that investors are allowed to trade assets with market-
determined prices and when investors are bound to follow pre-specified orders. Chari and 
Kehoe (2004) show that once these two rigorous assumptions are waived, herd behaviour re-
enters these models. Within the context of the recent crisis, herding actions of investors have 
contributed sequentially to the formation of the housing market bubble in the U.S. and some 
regions of Europe, the mortgage and other consumer debt bubbles, the derivatives' bubble 
(mainly collateralized debt obligations or CDOs), the crude oil futures bubble, and perhaps 
the emerging market currencies bubble (Mizen, 2008; Orlowski, 2008b; Akerlof/Shiller, 
2009). 
  
The massive liquidity in global money and capital markets is re-allocated into 
different asset classes in response to various economic signals, i.e. changes in interest rates, 
exchange rates, income and inflation expectations, etc. (Akerlof/Shiller, 2009). The process of 
global capital re-allocations between different asset classes during the course of the recent 
crisis has been examined by Orlowski (2008b) and labelled as a “wandering asset-price 
bubble”, which is the third useful framework for explaining prevalence of tail risks.  An 
outburst of financial crisis always engenders a large-scale correction of asset prices and a 
bank credit freeze due to a rapid increase of both liquidity and counter-party risks (rapidly 
depreciating assets cannot be easily liquidated and the likelihood of default by the parties 
entangled in contractual obligations increases).  This prescription has been endemic for the 
present financial crisis (Hellwig, 2008; Orlowski, 2008b). As home prices in the US started to 
decline in the early 2006, demand for mortgages by qualified prime borrowers began to 
recede. Eager to sustain their previous profits, mortgage companies engaged in aggressive 
lending to high-risk borrowers (as much as 40 percent of new mortgages in 2006 were granted 
to subprime or near-prime US borrowers). The banks were unwavering in securitization 
efforts of these high-risk loans, resulting in the issuance of financial derivatives, mainly 
collateralized debt obligations. The further corrections in home values in 2007 and 2008 led to 
a negative equity position for many mortgage loans (i.e., the value of an underlying property  
falling below the outstanding balance of the mortgage loan), making mortgage derivatives 
non-marketable and thus difficult to price. Moreover, a perpetual cycle of asset depreciation 
coupled with rising demand for more collateral developed (Brunnermeier, 2009). As asset 
prices entered a declining mode and lenders demanded more collateral, borrowers had to 
liquidate risky assets, which in turn led to a further decline in their market values and even 
higher demand for collateral. These processes ultimately led to the collapse of derivative 
securities and to a mounting market risk that gradually reverberated into: global credit risk, a 
wide-spread credit freeze, correction of nearly all international financial markets, and a world-
wide economic recession. 
 
The absence of relevant risk variables in financial models, particularly the measures of 
liquidity risk, has contributed to their failure to predict the recent global financial crisis.  The 
models that were commonly used prior to this crisis focused mainly on the expected returns of 
individual assets and their default risk, but largely ignored the liquidity and the counter-party 
risks. Therefore, the process of asset value deterioration, in which declining trust in counter-
parties freezes up markets and disables market pricing, has not been captured by the standard 
risk models.  The exclusion of liquidity risk from these models is perplexing given that the 
calls for adequate measuring of liquidity risk are not new.  Among others, Bangia, et. al   6
(2002) showed some parsimonious measures of liquidity risk and argued for its inclusion in 
market risk modelling
2.    
 
The prevalence of leptokurtosis in the time series distribution of financial variables 
has been well-known and documented in the literature. Most of the empirical studies 
addressing this problem have employed the extreme value method based on out-of-sample 
value-at-risk (VaR) computations. Applications of the VaR methodology have been routinely 
based on normal distribution. Thus, the reduced-form VaR model has failed to adequately 
evaluate risk and determine portfolio investment losses when markets are subject to extreme 
volatility outbursts.  Among others, Danielsson (2002) shows empirically that VaR tests with 
normal distribution provide improper guidance to investors at times of excessive volatility and 
are likely to exacerbate both idiosyncratic and systemic risk in turbulent periods.  To 
circumvent this problem, Longin (2000 and 2005) proposes VaR tests that rely on out-of-
sample extreme value computations by generating better-fitting distribution tails, particularly 
at times of elevated market volatility. Similarly, Gençay/ Selçuk (2004) use VaR with extreme 
value estimates for daily returns in a number of emerging stock markets, proving that their 
distributions have very different moment properties at their right and left tails. These studies 
were published prior to the extreme volatility outbursts associated with the recent (2007-
2009) global financial crisis, the scope of which has questioned applicability of VaR tests 
(even those relying on extreme value computations)  for an accurate market risk assessment.  
Recognizing the drawbacks of VaR methodology, this study extends the analysis of extreme 
risks by employing GARCH conditional volatility with GED parameterization for the 
identification of leptokurtosis. This allows for investigating the dramatic market vicissitudes 
engendered by the recent crisis.  
  
The prevalence of tail risks made interactions between different types of financial risk 
(liquidity, credit, default, interest rate, market, exchange rate risks, etc.) during the course of 
the recent crisis exceptionally intense. Their comprehensive empirical assessment remains a 
task for future research. I attempt to contribute to it by examining the impact of the main 
components of market risk on systemic risk.  
 
 
III.   Market Risk and Its Impact on Systemic Risk 
 
The underlying assumption for this analysis is that systemic risk stems from propagation of 
market risk. I further assume that market risk is proxied by volatility and forecasting 
uncertainty of key market variables, such as equity market indexes, interest rates and 
exchange rates. Thus, market risk is composed of equity market risk, interest rate risk and 
exchange rate risk.  Unexpected precipitation of these risks may lead to systemic risk. 
Elevated market risk makes asset, liability and risk management at financial institutions more 
difficult. It also complicates the strategy and conduct of monetary policy. 
    
Monitoring market risk is critical for the assessment of financial stability because 
market risk affects the valuation of risk of various types of financial assets.  Under elevated 
market risk conditions, the flow of accurate information between lenders and borrowers is 
disrupted, leading to greater information asymmetry. Increasing market volatility impairs 
asset price valuation, making it more difficult for lenders or issuers of credit and its 
derivatives to estimate the de facto credit risk associated with these instruments as well as the 
                                                 
2 Bangia, et al. (2002) claim that ignoring liquidity risk leads to underestimation of market risk in emerging 
markets by approximately 30 percent.   7
default risk of borrowers. As a result, the high risk environment leads to reluctance to 
purchase assets, which epitomizes financial crisis episodes (Mishkin, 2009). The difficulties 
to estimate the de facto value of a security, coupled with higher default risk and counter-party 
risk, ultimately lead to a credit freeze and, with some impact lag, to lower consumption, 
investment and economic growth. Moreover, an economic downturn may further exacerbate 
market risk as the value of assets may decrease due to changing market factors, which may 
generate an adverse feedback loop from financial disruption to economic slowdown. This 
process, known in the literature as the ‘financial accelerator’ (Bernanke, et.al, 1999), is found 
to amplify demand shocks on investment and to dampen supply shocks (Christensen/Dib, 
2008). 
 
For the above reasons, equity market risk, as it affects valuation of liquid assets is a 
crucial component of market risk. It is the risk that is common to an entire class of equity 
securities and is attributable to stock market volatility. Equity market risk has proven to be an 
important source of volatility of other asset classes, particularly at times of financial distress 
(Fleming, et.al, 1998). Daily changes in equity prices normally have a moderate causal impact 
on the direction of bond prices, exchange rates and commodity prices. This causal relationship 
has been magnified during the recent financial crisis that caused banks lose their capital. In 
response, many financial institutions were forced to sell various types of assets, as part of 
deleveraging strategies (reducing asset to equity ratios). Deleveraging pressure and fire sale of 
assets resulted in steep asset-price declines. Thus, volatile and declining equity prices induced 
a significant correction of other asset prices and contributed to systemic risk. Therefore, tail 
risks embedded in the behaviour of equity markets need to be accounted for in risk models. 
 
The  interest rate risk component of market risk is critical for asset/liability 
management at financial institutions, as it affects the duration gap, i.e. the disparity between 
rate sensitive assets and rate sensitive liabilities. Prior to this financial crisis the duration gap 
expanded substantially, in part due to an unprecedented increase in the leverage of major 
financial institutions.  This type of risk needs to be monitored closely by monetary policy-
makers. Elevated instability of short-term interest rates requires a departure from standard 
instrumentalization venues, i.e. adjustments of interest rates.  Since unstable rates increase the 
gap between (more volatile) nominal interest rates and the rate implied by an instrument rule, 
such as a simple or an open-economy Taylor rule, continuous reliance on an unremitting 
Taylor rule is likely to be inadequate. The presence of higher interest rate risk would lead to 
either a suboptimal choice of the policy instrument, with some costs to financial stability and 
social welfare, or to frequent adjustments of the interest rate target to the rule-implied rate, 
which would inhibit policy predictability and transparency.  For these reasons, in periods of 
financial crisis and elevated interest rate risk, monetary policy should become more 
discretionary by departing from rigid instrument rules that are normally designed for tranquil 
economic conditions.
3  Furthermore, during turbulent market periods policy 
instrumentalization and signalling may suffer additional impairments, such as the recent de-
                                                 
3 This notion follows the critique of Taylor rules by Svensson (2003) that at times of elevated interest rate risk 
compliance with such rules becomes implausible. In addition, Woodford (2001) points out that a time-invariant 
Taylor rule may distort the relation between nominal interest rate and the inflation- and output gaps when real 
economy shocks are present.  Inapplicability of Taylor rules for the euro-candidate countries at times of financial 
distress is expressed by Gabrisch (2009) and Orlowski (2010).  In support of a rule-based policy, Taylor (2009) 
calls for a prompt return to ‘the set of principles for setting interest rates that worked well during the Great 
Moderation’, in the aftermath of the present financial crisis. In a similar vein, Ahrend (2008) attributes the risk 
propagation during the recent crisis to excessive easing of monetary policies by the US Federal Reserve and 
other central banks that maintained the reference interest rates considerably below the Taylor rule-implied levels. 
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coupling of long-term and short-term interest rates. This distortion stems from weak markets 
for assets backed by securitized loans (unless such assets were guarantied by government 
agencies) and interest rate swaps. They can also be attributed to novel central banks’ policy 
actions, such as the long-term lending facility and direct loans to banks by the Federal 
Reserve or private debt purchases by the Bank of Japan. Nevertheless, these technical 
difficulties do not imply that central banks should entirely abandon short-term interest rate 
adjustments as a policy instrument in their interest rate risk mitigating attempts (Jobst, 2008; 
Mishkin, 2009).  In sum, the prevalence of tail risks embedded in interest rate movements 
calls for more discretionary, unconventional monetary policies. Sticking to a rule-based policy 
course may increase probability of systemic risk. 
 
Identification and management of exchange rate risk is important for both financial 
institutions and monetary authorities. Rapid increases in exchange rate volatility impede the 
valuation of assets and the assessment of borrowing costs  at financial institutions and other 
economic agents exposed to foreign currency translations. Sudden increases in exchange rate 
risk necessitate application of more sophisticated methods of asset/liability management at 
financial institutions. For policy-makers, excessive volatility of exchange rates distorts 
information about the exchange rate channel of monetary policy transmission
4.  In essence, 
unexpected increases in exchange rate volatility inhibit effective implementation of monetary 
policy and normally lead to higher interest rate on domestic credit, as financial institutions 
translate a higher cost of foreign currency borrowings into a higher credit risk premium. 
 
In hindsight, precipitation of tail risks embedded in the behaviour of equity markets, 
interest rates and exchange rates may lead to systemic risk. It obfuscates asset/liability 
management at financial institutions and hinders monetary policy implementation.      
 
 
IV.   Empirical Analysis of Tail Risks 
 
The focus of empirical analysis is on the proliferation of tail risks for the key financial 
variables that comprise market risk, i.e. equity market indexes, interest rates as approximated 
by inter-bank lending rates, and exchange rates relative to the euro. I aim to determine the 
magnitude and precipitation of tail risks in selected European countries prior to and during the 
course of recent financial crisis. To reflect upon variety of EU financial markets, I select a 
group of seven larger countries. This group encompasses two dichotomies. The first 
distinguishes between the incumbent and the new EU members, as defined on the basis of the 
2004 enlargement, and the second distinguishes between the eurozone and the euro-
candidates. I choose the larger countries that follow more autonomous monetary policies with 
flexible exchange rates in order to account for the dynamics of exchange rate risk. The 
examined group of countries includes the three largest new EU members who are expected to 
join the euro – the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland; the two largest EU and eurozone 
members – France and Germany; and two incumbent EU members pursuing autonomous 
monetary policies outside the eurozone – Sweden and the United Kingdom. I then compare 
these countries results with those for the United States, where the crisis has originated.  The 
tests are based on daily average market data for the sample period January 3, 2000-September 
14, 2009 (2540 observations). 
                                                 
4 This channel has been proven to play a particularly important role in the economies converging to the euro 
since it has a relatively short impact lag translating currency appreciation (depreciation) into disinflation 
(inflation) through pass-through effects of import prices (Golinelli/Rovelli, 2005; Orlowski, 2005; 
Kočenda/Poghosyan, 2009).   9
Prior to conducting the econometric tests, I scan the examined variables for 
leptokurtosis. The results of this scanning are shown in Table 1. The data distribution of daily 
changes of all equity market indexes, interbank rates and exchange rates is highly leptokurtic, 
since all kurtosis coefficients are greater than 3. In some cases, namely of the German DAX 
market index and the Hungarian and Swedish interbank rates, leptokurtosis is extreme 
indicating high probability of very large shocks at times of financial instability.  The obtained 
kurtosis measures suggest a potential flaw in econometric models that assume a normal 
distribution of these variables, because such models are likely to underestimate volatility or 
tail risks at turbulent periods.  
  
Table 1:  Kurtosis coefficients of financial market variables 
 
Country (market)  ∆log of stock market 
indexes 
∆ of interbank 
lending rates 
∆log of exchange 
rates vis-à-vis  EUR 
Czech  Republic  15.71 117.18 10.26 
France 8.10  66.84  - 
Germany 607.29  66.84  - 
Hungary 9.40  235.04 14.30 
Poland  9.18 34.57 7.81 
Sweden  5.97 436.38 7.73 
United  Kingdom  7.49 169.64 7.72 
United States  21.98  58.45  6.12 
 
Notes: January 3, 2000-September 14, 2009 sample period. Equity market indexes: Prague SEPX, Paris CAC40, 
German DAX40, Budapest BUDEX, Warsaw WIG20, Stockholm SMIALL, UK FTALL, US S&P500; three-
month interbank rates: Prague-Pribor, Euribor, Budapest Bibor, Warsaw-Wibor, Stockholm-Stibor, London-
Libor, USD Libor; the kurtosis coefficient k>3 indicates leptokurtic data distribution. 
Source:  Author’s own estimation based on Datastream data. 
 
I therefore proceed to econometric testing of conditional volatility that accounts for 
tail risks. For this purpose, I employ the generalized auto-regressive conditional 
heteroscedasticity method with in-mean conditional variance and generalized error 
distribution parameterization (GARCH-M-GED).  I do not aim to find the best-fit forecast 
functions; instead, I emphasize the pattern of noise, or volatility gyrations particularly during 
the course of the recent crisis.  I use a parsimonious GARCH(1,1) specification  to ascertain 
the overall risk compression. Such compression takes place when the sum of ARCH 
(innovations to volatility) and GARCH (persistency in volatility) estimated coefficients is  
below unity; when it exceeds unity, the risk dispersion occurs. To determine whether the 
return on a financial asset is positive or negative, I include the (log of) GARCH conditional 
variance in the conditional mean equation. Most importantly, my analytical objective is to 
demonstrate that the volatility pattern follows a leptokurtic distribution, which occurs when 
the estimated GED parameter is less than 2.  
 
To capture the degree of leptokurtosis exhibited by financial market variables, I use a 
two-step GARCH(1,1)-M-GED  process  represented by  two equations. The first one consists 
of general specification of the conditional mean equation: 
 
t t rt t Y ε σ β β + + = −
2
1 1 0 log                                                                                        (1) 
   10
where  rt t Y is a regressant that is treated respectively as either the equity market index, the 
interbank interest rate or exchange rate.  The conditional mean equation includes the log of 
GARCH conditional variance 
2
1 log − t σ  as a regressor.  The second equation is the 







− − + + = t t t h h σ γ ε σ                                                                                           (2) 
 
The ARCH(1) term denoted by 
2
1 − t ε  represents the impact of the previous-period news, or 
‘innovations’ to volatility on current volatility. The GARCH(1) term 
2
1 − t σ  reflects persistency 
in volatility.   
 
 
V.   Equity Market Risk 
 
To analyze the developments in equity market risk, I look at the return process  t r  of daily 
percentage changes in domestic stock market index as a regressant in the conditional mean 
equation, which is  rt t rt t E Y log = . The conditional volatility testing of the percentage changes 
in stock market indexes is conducted for:  S&P500 (the United States), DAX40 (Germany), 
CAC40 (France), FTALL (the United Kingdom), SMIALL (Sweden), WIG20 (Poland), 
SEPX (Czech Republic) and BUDEX (Hungary).  The empirical results of the GARCH series 
of daily percentage changes (∆logs) in these indexes are shown in Table 2. 
  
 
Table 2:  GARCH(1,1)-M-GED estimation of percentage changes (∆logs) in stock market 
indexes 
 
  Czech R.  France  Germany  Hungary  Poland  Sweden  U.K.  U.S. 




































































































































Notes: January 3, 2000- September 14, 2009 sample period (2540 observations);  the financial crisis sub-period 
is August 17, 2007 – March 31, 2009 (423 observations); *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 
10%. 
Source:  Author’s own estimation based on Datastream data. 
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As implied by the signs of the estimated in-mean GARCH variance coefficients, the 
risk premium is positive and significant only for U.S. equity market index. It is significant and 
negative for the Czech and German market indexes. The result for the U.S. is in line with its 
fattest tail risk among all countries for the entire sample period (the lowest GED parameter). 
Risk convergence represented by the sum of ARCH and GARCH coefficients not exceeding 
unity is detected only in the Czech case.  In line with the main argument of this study, 
leptokurtosis exhibited by stock market data is ubiquitous (GED￿2).  It is the most 
pronounced for the U.S., followed by the German, Polish, Czech, U.K. and Hungarian equity 
markets, and least pronounced for the Swedish and French markets. 
 
To ascertain if the financial crisis has altered the degree of leptokurtosis of these 
equity market indexes, I repeat GARCH(1,1)-M-GED tests for the financial crisis sub-period 
starting from the outbreak of the crisis on August 17, 2007 and ending on March 31, 2009.  
During this sub-period, tail risks increased dramatically for the German market, less for the 
Polish and Hungarian markets, and actually decreased for the remaining markets.  However, 
these results may be attributable to a smaller sample size and the variance resetting to a higher 
level associated with the crisis period.   
 
Further insights into the time distribution of the volatility series of stock market 
indexes are provided by the graphs showing GARCH conditional standard deviations (Figures 




Figures 1a-h:  GARCH one standard deviation residuals series for individual stock markets.  
 
Notes: The left vertical line (observation #1989) coincides with the outbreak of the US subprime mortgage crisis 
on August 17, 2007 and the right line (observation # 2289) corresponds with the crisis peak on October 10, 2008. 
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Source: Author’s own estimation based on Datastream data.  
 
 
The time patterns of GARCH standard deviations vary between the analyzed equity 
markets due to their institutional discrepancies that are systemic in nature, as well as to 
differences in macroeconomic fundamentals. Nevertheless, at least four common effects can 
be identified. First, GARCH volatility was considerably elevated by higher political risk   13
following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on the U.S. This result is more apparent for 
the U.S., U.K., French and Swedish equity markets and more subdued in the remaining cases.  
Second, the outbreak of the financial crisis in August 2007 did not have a significant impact 
on stock markets’ volatility, as the crisis was originally believed to be confined to the 
subprime mortgage market in the U.S. only. Third, following the initial restrain at the onset of 
the crisis, stock markets’ volatility became visibly elevated in December 2007 and early 
January 2008 when the crisis began spreading into global credit and derivative securities 
markets (Hellwig, 2008; Orlowski, 2008b).  Fourth, the sudden occurrence of systemic risk in 
the early October of 2008 (in the aftermath of the Lehman Brothers collapse) induced an 
unprecedented shock to stock markets’ volatility. The German market reaction is particularly 
interesting. While unperturbed during the benign  instability periods in the past, the DAX 
volatility jumped by an unprecedented margin just four days after the global credit freeze on 
October 10, 2008, when it became apparent that the leading German banks had played a larger 
than previously assumed role in high-risk mortgage lending and asset securitization in the 
U.S. and elsewhere.  This incident shows that the German equity market is susceptible to very 
pronounced tail risk, the scale of which could not be possibly estimated prior to the peak of 
this crisis.  
 
The next step is to gain additional insights into equity market risk patterns by 
assessing global transmission of stock market volatility on the basis of impulse response 
functions. For this purpose, I analyze the vector autoregressive (VAR) setting with 5-day 
lagged periods for all stock markets.  In particular, I focus on transmission of one-standard 
deviation shocks from the U.S. S&P500 index into the remaining equity market indexes, by 
using impulse response functions with the Bayesian (Monte Carlo) error distribution (Figure 
2). By the nature of the Choleski decomposition, the impulse responses depend on the 
ordering of the variables, thus the responses are set to zero in the first period for all market 
indexes except for the S&P500.  
 
Figure 2:   Impulse responses of percentage changes (∆logs) in individual stock market 
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Response of DLOG(SP500) to DLOG(SP500)
Response to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.
 
Notes: from upper left to lower right diagrams: German DAX40, Polish WIG40, Hungarian Budex, UK FTALL, 
Czech PrSMI, Swedish SWEDOMX, French CAC40, S&P500 itself. Data generating process (DGP) 
assumptions: 5 lags in VAR, Monte Carlo error distribution for 5 periods. 
Source: Author’s own estimation based on Datastream data.  
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The impulse response functions show pronounced two-day reactions of the examined 
stock market indexes to a one-standard-deviation shock in the U.S. S&P500. This shock 
transmission is uniform for all markets with the notable exception of the German DAX, which 
seems to be quite immune to the U.S.-generated shocks.  However, the German effect is 
obtained from routine reactions over the entire sample period and it does not reflect the mid-
October 2008 turbulence, thus it needs to be interpreted with caution. 
 
To summarize, tail risks are prevalent in equity markets as implied by the GARCH 
testing of equity market indexes, particularly by the time distribution of GARCH standard 
deviations. The equity markets are subject to unparallel and rather unpredictable shocks 
during turbulent market periods.  Shocks from the U.S. market seem to have triggered 
volatility outbursts in other markets. These prevalent tail risks along with their transmission 
channels should be taken into consideration in devising macroprudential policy responses 
aimed at mitigating market risk. 
 
 
VI.   Interest Rate Risk 
 
The second component of market risk examined in this study is interest rate risk, proxied by 
volatility of the three-month domestic interbank lending rates.  Changes in these rates denoted 
as 
IB
rt t i ∆   enter the conditional mean equation as a regressant, thus for the purpose of this 
analysis 
IB
rt t rt t i Y ∆ =  in Eq.(1).   
 
  The results of the GARCH(1,1)-M-GED estimations  of daily changes in interbank 
rates are shown in Table 3.  These results are highly significant statistically as the GED 
parameters are all very low, indicating high leptokurtosis. They are considerably below the 
levels estimated for the volatility of equity market indexes. Evidently, interbank rates tend to 
be very stable at benign market periods, but extremely explosive at turbulent market times.  
Moreover, risk premiums associated with interbank rate volatility (logGARCH-in-mean 
coefficients) vary significantly across the examined countries.  In the Czech case, there is a 
high, positive risk premium, in line with the disproportionally stronger ARCH effect (shocks 
to volatility) in relation to the GARCH effect (persistency in volatility).  In contrast, in the 
U.S., Sweden and the U.K., the risk premia are negative consistently with the stronger role of 
the GARCH relative to ARCH effects, although the interpretation of the U.K. Libor time 
series is less straightforward. The London interbank rate tests had to be augmented with 
higher-order ARCH and asymmetric threshold (TGARCH) effects due to high instability of 
the simple GARCH(1,1) specification. 
 
In addition, Table 3 shows evidence of volatility or risk divergence observed in the 
Hungarian interbank rate and the Euribor as the sum of ARCH and GARCH coefficients is 
greater than unity for the entire sample period.  This volatility divergence seems to be 
attributable to the financial crisis and can be also observed in Figures 3b and 3c. In contrast, 
the volatility patterns of the remaining interbank rates suggest risk convergence, since the 
estimated 1 1 1 γ + h . It can be further noted that leptokurtosis exhibited by the Czech, Polish, 
Swedish and U.K. interbank rate data increased, i.e. GED parameters declined during the 
financial crisis sub-period.  During the same sub-period, tail risks for Hungarian, eurozone 
and U.S. rates decreased as their GED parameters increased and their mean volatility became 
reset at higher levels. 
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Table 3:   GARCH(1,1)-M-GED estimation of changes in interbank rates 
 
  Czech R.  Eurozone  Hungary  Poland Sweden  U.K.  1)  U.S. 












































































































Notes: Three-month interbank rates: Prague Pribor, Euribor, Budapest Bibor, Warsaw Wibor, Stockholm Stibor, 
London Libor, USD Libor.  January 3, 2000-September 14, 2009 sample period (2540 observations);  the 
financial crisis sub-period is August 17, 2007 – March 31, 2009 (423 observations); *** denotes significance at 
1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. 
1)  Due to significant second-order asymmetric effects, the U.K. Libor time series is specified with threshold 
terms as TGARCH(2,2,1)-M-GED; the ARCH(2) coefficient = -0.122***, TARCH(1) coefficient = 0.069***, 
TARCH(2) coefficient = -0.069***. 
Source:  Author’s own estimation based on Datastream data. 
 
 
  The time patterns of the interbank rate volatility series are shown in Figures 3a-h.  
During the early period of the present decade, the Czech and Polish interbank rates show very 
high volatility triggered by both domestic and external factors. The domestic factors include 
insufficiently developed bond markets and inflationary pressures. The term spreads on 
sovereign bonds were highly unstable and did not provide adequate benchmarks for other 
interest rates, including interbank rates, following the inception of the long-term government 
bond markets in these countries. In addition, they experienced elevated political risk in the 
aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attack on the United States that contributed to interest 
rates volatility in all emerging European markets
5. Figures 3a and 3c indicate that volatility of 
interbank rates in Poland and the Czech Republic during the early period was much higher 
than in the course of the recent crisis.  In a somewhat different vein, volatility of the 
Hungarian interbank rates reached very high levels in 2003 when the country’s fiscal 
discipline changed its course resulting in higher government borrowings and ultimately higher 
volatility of interest rates.  Volatility of the Euribor (Figure 3b) was also very high in the early 
years of the present decade, as credibility of the financial system in the new currency area 
needed to be established. Volatility of interbank rates in the United States was soaring as well 




                                                 
5 Further evidence on factors affecting risks faced by Eastern European banking sectors is provided by 
Männassoo and Mayes (2009) who demonstrate the adverse effects of inflationary pressures, exchange rate 
movements and bank-specific institutional deficiencies on these risks.    16
Figures 3a-g: GARCH one standard deviation residuals series for changes in interbank rates.  
 
Note: The left vertical line (observation #1989) coincides with the outbreak of the US subprime mortgage crisis 
on August 17, 2007 and the right line (observation # 2289) corresponds with the crisis peak on October 10, 2008. 
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  In sum, the recent financial crisis has triggered large adverse effects on interest rate 
volatility in all examined countries. However, the degree of instability of interbank rates is not 
uniform. The most significant jump in interbank rates volatility can be observed in Hungary 
on October 12, 2008 (Figure 3c).   This jump stemmed from spillover effects of the global 
credit market freeze in the aftermath of the Lehman Brothers collapse that, seemingly, had a 
strong effect on countries with less-disciplined macroeconomic policies, such as Hungary.  
Volatility of the U.S. (Figure 3g) and the U.K. (Figure 3f) interbank rates was in sync and 
certainly reached a zenith at that time, since both markets were at the source of the global 
credit malaise. It can be further noted that the transmission of global gyrations in interbank 
rates in October 2008 into the Swedish and Polish banking systems was considerably delayed. 
Interbank rates volatility in these countries peaked only at the end of 2008 and the beginning 
of 2009, because their banking systems were initially perceived as somewhat immune to the 
global credit freeze. 
 
The international transmission of shocks from the U.S. into other interbank credit 
markets can be observed from the VAR analysis and impulse response functions shown in 
Figure 4. The responses pertain to reactions of interbank rates at their levels and not at their 
first differences, as such treatment allows for a more straightforward interpretation of the 
obtained results. As it can be expected from the degree of integration and linkages between 
interbank lending markets, there is a strong transmission of a positive shock from the U.S. 
dollar (USD) 3M Libor to the U.K. Libor as well as to the Euribor. The transmission from the 
US to the Swedish interbank rate is moderate.  In contrast, the impact of U.S. shocks on the 
emerging Europe is minimal. In the case of Hungary, some adverse effects can be observed 
for the duration exceeding four days.  These results verify that the interbank lending markets 
in emerging Europe are less integrated with the U.S. market and, therefore, more immune to 
the absorption of U.S. shocks than their Western European counterparts. 
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Figure 4:    Impulse responses of individual 3M inter-bank offer rates to a one-standard 
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Response of EURIBOR to USLIBOR
Response to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.
 
Notes: From upper left to lower right: US Libor, UK Libor, Polish Wibor, Czech Pribor, Hungarian Bibor, 
Swedish Swibor, Euribor. DGP assumptions: 5 lags in VAR, Monte Carlo error distribution for 10 periods. 
Source: Author’s own estimation based on Datastream data. 
 
 
Based on the examination of volatility dynamics and transmission effects of interbank 
rates during the recent financial crisis, an additional conclusion can be drawn that 
unexpectedly high interest rate volatility leads to deterioration in the capital position of 
financial institutions, particularly those with a significant foreign currency exposure.  This 
was the case of banks in the larger new EU members, including Poland.  These banks 
generated vast amounts of Swiss franc and euro denominated mortgage loans that 
subsequently increased in market value, as expressed in their domestic currencies, when these 
countries’ currencies depreciated. This in turn, coupled with increasing interest rate volatility, 
widened the duration gap between banks’ rate-sensitive assets and liabilities on the one hand, 
and deteriorated the market value of banks’ equity on the other. In conclusion, rising volatility 
of interest rates contributes to widening of the leverage-adjusted duration gap and to 
decreasing of the equity capital of financial institutions.  To lower their duration gap, protect 
solvency and avert possible bank runs in periods of crisis, financial institutions need to raise 
capital above the statutory required levels in tranquil market periods. 
  
 
VII.   Exchange Rate Risk 
 
Exchange rate volatility is tested by using the GARCH(1,1)-M-GED specification. The 
percentage changes in the exchange rate, denoted as( ) rt t s log ∆ , enter the conditional mean 
equation as a regressant.  Therefore,   rt t rt t Y s = ∆log  in Eq.(1).  Euro (EUR) is chosen here as 
a benchmark in order to ascertain relative stability of the remaining European currencies, as 
well as the USD.  The results are presented in Table 4. 
 
These results show a significant negative risk premium on the EUR for the Hungarian 
forint (HUF) and USD (or positive risk premium on these two highly volatile currencies in 
EUR-terms) as implied by the negative signs of the logGARCH-in-mean coefficients.     19
Variability of the remaining currencies is in-sync with EUR, with no significant premiums or 
discounts detected.  The HUF per EUR also shows the highest degree of leptokurtosis that 
was exhibited mainly during the two-year period following the country’s abandonment of the 
crawling peg regime in October 2001 (see Figure 5b). It is, however, worth noting that for all 
examined currencies the tail risks associated with exchange rate volatility are less pronounced 
than the tail risks detected for interbank rates volatility. 
 
 
Table 4:  GARCH(1,1)-M-GED estimation of percentage changes (∆logs) in exchange rates 
(domestic currency values of 1EUR). 
 




































































































Notes: January 3, 2000-September 14, 2009 sample period; crisis sub-period is August 17, 2007-March 31, 2009. 
*** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. 




  In addition, the HUF per EUR time series show strong risk propagation during the 
entire sample period, as the sum of ARCH and GARCH coefficients exceeds unity.  The 
HUF’s conditional volatility has been amplified by the recent financial crisis (Figure 5b)
6.  
Again, volatility of the remaining currencies is broadly synchronized with EUR, the Czech 
koruna (CZK) and the Swedish krona (SEK) exchange rates showing even a mild volatility 
compression.   
 
  Figures 5a-f show a strong evidence that the recent financial crisis has contributed to a 
pronounced propagation of exchange rate risk for all examined currencies.  These results are 
based on the distributions of the GARCH conditional standard deviation residuals over the 
sample period. It is worth noting that this propagation of exchange rate volatility did not 
                                                 
6 There is strong evidence that the highest exchange rate risk in the case of Hungary stems from its high fiscal 
deficit and public debt, as well as pro-cyclicality of its real economy (Kočenda/Poghosyan, 2009).  In light of 
this elevated exchange rate risk, the focus of the National Bank of Hungary on the exchange rate stability target 
comes into question.  As shown by Orlowski (2008a and 2010), in spite of the official declaration of inflation 
targeting, monetary policy implementation in Hungary was focused on exchange rate stability.  In hindsight, 
Hungarian monetary authorities are pursuing a very flexible approach to inflation targeting with two seemingly 
conflicting goals, i.e. low inflation and exchange rate stability. This dual-target approach unfortunately tends to 
exacerbate financial risk.    20
emerge instantly with the crisis’ outbreak in August 2007.  It evolved rather slowly during its 
early period between August 2007 and October 2008. Prior to this crisis, exchange rate 
volatility was generally quite subdued although rather uneven across the examined currencies 
and over the sample period. Initially, there was an increase in volatility for USD, the British 
pound (GBP), CZK and HUF, but a decrease for SEK.  After the peak of the crisis in mid-
October 2008, exchange rate risk escalated. This escalation persisted until February 2009 and 
was more severe than the one exhibited during the previous market turbulence of 2001-2002. 
Since then, it has been receding, however at a staggered pace through 2009.  Nonetheless, the 
proliferation of exchange rate risk lagged behind that of equity market and interest rate risks. 
Plausible reasons for this lag can be derived from the examination of transmission channels of 
exchange rate volatility between international currency markets. 
 
 
Figures 5a-f:   GARCH one standard deviation residuals series for exchange rates (domestic 
currency values of one EUR).  
 
Notes: The left solid vertical line (observation #1989) coincides with the outbreak of the US subprime mortgage 
crisis on August 17, 2007 and the right solid line (observation # 2289) corresponds with the crisis peak on 
October 10, 2008. 
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     Source: Author’s own estimation based on Datastream data. 
 
 
I conduct this examination on the basis of impulse response functions and present the 
results in Figure 6.  The multiple graphs show responses of percentage changes in individual 
exchange rates ( ) rt t s log ∆  to a one-standard-deviation shock to the EUR value in USD.  In 
essence, this cross-elasticity treatment shows time distribution of responsiveness (elasticity) 
of individual currencies to USD via their respective values in EUR. 
 
Figure 6:   Impulse responses of daily percentage changes in exchange rates to a one-standard 
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Response of DLOG(GBPEUR) to DLOG(USDEUR)
Response to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.
 
 
Notes: From upper left to lower right EUR values in: USD itself, CZK, HUF, PLN, SEK and GBP. DGP 
assumptions: 5 lags in VAR, Monte Carlo error distribution for 6 periods. 
Source: Author’s own estimation based on Datastream data. 
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There is a strong, instantaneous transmission of depreciation of the GBP and the 
Polish zloty (PLN) in response to a one-standard-deviation shock depreciating USD in EUR 
terms (appreciating EUR).  The reactions of the CZK and SEK rates are almost non-existent, 
while there is an adverse response of the HUF – the USD depreciation is causing the HUF 
appreciation.  The HUF effect stems likely from the Hungary’s ERM2-shadowing exchange 
rate mechanism that was in place for most of the sample period.  The PLN and GBP reactions 
imply effective pursuit of full-fledged floating exchange rate regimes. However, these 
regimes make their currencies more susceptible to the USD-generated shocks.  
 
In sum, the scale of propagation of the exchange rate risk depends on susceptibility of 
local currency markets to the developments in global markets. It also depends on the state of 
macroeconomic fundamentals, with some resilience in countries with disciplined fiscal and 
monetary policies (for instance Sweden).  
 
 
VIII.   Policies Aimed at Mitigating Tail Risks and Reducing Pro-Cyclicality 
 
The widely unanticipated scope of the recent crisis has underscored the need for appropriate 
policies that would mitigate potential future volatility outbursts in financial markets and avert 
systemic risk. These policies need to account for tail risks associated with excessive volatility 
of key financial market variables that were examined in the previous sections. 
 
Policies aimed at abating tail risks should have two distinctive characteristics: counter-
cyclicality and flexibility.  Pro-cyclicality stems from the interactions between financial and 
real economy variables. Therefore the nexus between tail risks and pro-cyclicality seems 
rather apparent. During times of volatility outbursts the rising risk premia on interest rates 
ultimately hinder investment and consumption, triggering recessionary effects. More 
pronounced tail risks pose a threat to financial stability and engender systemic risk. For this 
reason, counter-cyclical policies are likely to mitigate tail risks. This characteristic relates to 
both, monetary and macroprudential policies. 
 
Because of the ubiquitous character of extreme tail risks across financial markets, a 
macroprudential policy approach seems to be well suited for mitigating these risks, as it 
relates to the financial system as a whole and considers aggregate risk as endogenous, 
stemming from the collective behaviour of market participants.
7 Before discussing specific 
macroprudential policies, I emphasize the desirable features of monetary policies that seem to 
be conducive to financial stability.  
 
In principle, I subscribe to the dichotomy between the concerns of monetary policies 
and the concerns of financial stability policies as pointed out, among others, by Borio/White 
(2004), White (2009) and Svensson (2010). Monetary policy in its traditional sense aims at 
achieving price stability in the long-run, which is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for 
financial stability. Therefore, it is imperative to acknowledge that the task of containing tail 
risks cannot be accomplished by monetary policy alone. The perception of the monetary 
policy role in containing financial crises has evolved in light of the recent crisis. According to 
standard Keynesian prescription rooted in the experience of the Great Depression of the 
1930s, monetary policy cannot effectively contain the crisis because it is unable to lower the 
cost of credit in the presence of severe shocks. This approach has been challenged by 
                                                 
7 For a comprehensive survey of macroprudential policy responses to systemic risk see Bullard, et.al (2009).   23
advocates of monetary expansion within the context of the recent crisis (Mishkin, 2009; Jobst, 
2009; Curdia/Woodford, 2010). According to Mishkin (2009), the aggressive monetary policy 
easing in response to the recent crisis has been justified on the basis of very high perceived 
opportunity costs of refraining from it. An absence of monetary expansion would lead to 
exorbitant cost of credit and a further precipitation of systemic risk with even wider credit 
spreads. It’s been known that the quantitative easing with zero-bound interest rates and 
massive liquidity injections of 2009 has helped reduce interest-rate spreads over risk-free 
government securities (such as the Treasury Bill-to-Eurodollar or TED spread). Several 




It seems that a forward-looking flexible inflation targeting policy based on a dual 
mandate of price stability and financial stability is likely to engender economic stability in the 
long-run.
9 Such policy is based on “constrained discretion” (Bernanke et al 1999), which 
allows for at times unexpected policy adjustments responding to transitory shocks of key 
financial variables. More specifically, a forward-looking flexible inflation targeting policy 
framework allows the central bank to focus on the inflation target and also on the additional 
policy objective which may (and should) include mitigating potential risks associated with 
credit bubbles.  In essence, such forward-looking approach means that monetary policy 
should ‘lean’ against credit bubbles, rather than ‘clean up’ the bubble effects afterwards 
(White, 2009).  In order to fulfil such dual mandate, monetary authorities should develop 
fairly accurate models that could project potential credit bubbles. Such models ought to take 
into consideration prevalent tail risks embedded in the behaviour of underlying financial 
variables.  In contrast to a flexible policy with a dual mandate of price stability and financial 
stability, a fully discretionary policy without a specific objective of leaning against projected 
credit bubbles would hinder financial stability and undermine monetary policy predictability 
and credibility in the long-run.  It is because unpredictability intensifies tail risks under 
stressful market conditions, as market participants demand substantial risk premiums on 
interest rates. 
   
Within the framework of macroprudential policy approach, a flexible treatment of 
capital adequacy requirements deserves consideration  (IMF GFSR, September 2009). At 
present, capital adequacy requirements are based on the Basel regime that assumes a constant 
capital ratio for the purpose of ensuring stability of the banking sector. However, these fixed 
requirements proved to be insufficient during the recent crisis when elevated interest rate 
volatility adversely affected banks capital and solvency. As demonstrated in this paper, 
various types of risk, particularly interest rate risk, are subject to sudden changes in response 
to shifts in market expectations and due to prevalence of tail risks stemming from excessive 
volatility.  An adverse effect of elevated volatility takes place when assets and liabilities of a 
financial institution are mismatched in terms of maturities. Specifically, when a financial 
institution faces a large leverage-adjusted duration gap (the duration of assets exceeding the 
leverage-adjusted duration of liabilities), an increase in interest rates ultimately reduces the 
institution’s capital position, adversely affecting its solvency. For these reasons, capital 
                                                 
8 In the aftermath the Lehman Brothers collapse, the TED spread jumped to an unprecedented level of 464 basis 
points on October 10, 2008, reflecting a freeze of global credit markets.  The massive liquidity injections by the 
Federal Reserve and other central banks have helped reduce the TED spread gradually to a more normal level 
oscillating around 20 bps since the beginning of September 2009, see Bloomberg interactive chart .TEDSP:IND.  
9 For the economies converging to the euro, I advocate the policy framework of relative inflation forecast 
targeting  that aims at lowering differentials between the domestic and the euro area inflation forecasts 
(Orlowski, 2008a).     24
adequacy ratios should be specified as a range, rather than a fixed level, in order to secure 
their sufficiently flexible functioning. In good times, a regulatory authority may increase 
capital requirements allowing a financial institution to build a buffer against adverse events. 
Both mandatory core and total capital to risk-weighted asset ratios could be raised to higher 
levels or to an upper boundary of a predetermined range when volatility is out of sight. During 
times of financial distress these ratios could be reduced to a lower boundary in order to 
sustain bank lending.  
 
  The aspect of risk-based capital requirements within the framework of capital 
adequacy deserves a special emphasis. The risk-based weights that are assigned to the 
individual asset classes need to be better aligned with the actual risk exposure from these 
assets. Most importantly, modelling related to capturing risk needs to be adjusted to account 
for tail risks that are inherent in the behaviour of financial variables.  
 
The implementation of a discretionary management of capital adequacy may pose 
difficulties to financial regulators due to imperfect forecasting of market behaviour, which is 
customarily affected by unpredictable random factors (Borio/Drehmann, 2009a and 2009b).  
In addition, a flexible treatment of capital adequacy could engender some uncertainty about 
the regulators’ actions forcing financial institutions to impose higher interest rate risk premia 
or to contract lending at all times.   
 
In addition to the range-specified capital adequacy ratios, flexible treatment of capital 
adequacy requirements can be accomplished by allowing financial institutions to issue 
contingent capital, as originally proposed by Flannery (2005). Contingent capital consists of 
debt instruments that can be converted into equity when sudden pressure on bank’s balance 
sheet occurs and capital becomes insufficient.
10  Such conversion would strengthen the 
institution’s capital position when it could otherwise face a credit freeze. Convertible capital 
entails a number of benefits for financial institutions. First, since it allows for replenishing of 
equity when it becomes depleted, contingent capital lowers the bank’s point of default, thus it 
lessens the need for governments bailouts. Second, it provides banks with a readily available 
source of capital when it becomes more difficult to obtain. Third, it helps banks broaden the 
available tools of risk management using the same source of capital for both normal and 
stressful market conditions. In sum, convertible capital can provide leverage in good times 
and a buffer at bad times. 
 
   There are some potential drawbacks related to the use of contingent capital. First, 
investors may be reluctant to purchase such convertible debt instrument unless they have 
confidence that the issuing financial institution can survive a crisis. Second, if the financial 
institution encounters funding difficulties that would trigger a conversion, the value of a 
common equity would be adversely affected due to its dilution. On a positive side, such 
possibility should create additional incentive for a financial institution to manage against a 
possible downside.  There is also (a less valid) concern that the convertible capital may take a 
dominant position over core capital in the capital structure of financial institutions.  A 
challenging task for policy makers would be to determine a conversion trigger. An accurate 
timing of the actual conversion and a precise assessment of the required amount of contingent 
                                                 
10 A noteworthy version of contingent capital has been recently proposed by Kashyap, et. al (2008) who suggest 
to create a “capital insurance” for systemically important leveraged financial institutions. These institutions 
would be able to buy fully collateralized insurance policies from unleveraged institutions or government. In 
practical terms, such insurance could be provided by institutional investors (mainly pension funds or sovereign 
wealth funds) willing to assume greater risk for an additional premium.   25
capital may pose additional technical difficulties. However, none of these concerns have been 
adequately tested and they may be assuaged with an appropriate, specific regulation
11. 
 
In sum, contingent capital could serve as an effective tool for abating tail risks and 
improving the policy responses to future financial crises. It would allow policy makers to 
avoid the cyclicality of capital adequacy requirements. The anticipated timing of financial 
distress along with an expected magnitude of tail risks associated with the behaviour of 
financial market variables can be monitored and assessed for the EU markets by the newly-
formed European Systemic Risk Board, which can also issue specific guidelines and 
directives for using these measures. 
 
Within the framework of micro-prudential supervision a worth noting is a proposal to 
regulate trading in derivative financial securities, and in particular to subject these instruments 
to clearinghouse operations.  Such treatment of derivative securities is essential for mitigating 
default and counter-party risks exposure of individual members of a clearinghouse by 
requiring them to meet capital and disclosure requirements. A clearinghouse operating as a 
central counter-party for trades executed on an exchange reduces the risk that a trader defaults 
on his obligation. Since it is capitalized by its members, a clearinghouse also allows 
regulators to assess market positions and prices.  By spreading risks across its members, 
clearinghouse contributes to smoothing risks associated with individual securities, thus also to 
lowering tail risks.  Considering these effects, this initiative is likely to reduce tail risks 
associated with market gyrations.  
 
  In addition to modifications in macro- and micro-prudential policies, the prevalence of 
tail risks should be considered in devising appropriate exit strategies from the recent 
expansionary policies aimed at stimulating economic growth and restoring financial 
stability
12. Specific exit strategies should be based on gradual departure from quantitative 
easing and should take into consideration projections and responses to tail risks. Thus they 




IX.   A Summary 
 
This study draws attention to the prevalence of tail risks of key financial variables in order to 
reflect upon the degree of their instability at times of financial distress. Tail risks have played 
a major role in proliferation of the recent global financial crisis that began in August 2007.   
The prevalence of tail risks was largely neglected prior to this financial meltdown. However, 
these risks had a profound impact on the propagation and escalation of the recent crisis. 
 
  The focus of the empirical analysis is on the detection of tail risks in selected financial 
variables that encompass market risk, i.e. equity market indexes, interbank rates and exchange 
rates.  These variables are analyzed for a diverse group of EU member countries, including 
                                                 
11 Contingent capital requirements have been endorsed by policy-makers, including the Bank of England 
Governor Mervyn King (2009) and the Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke (2008). 
12 A compelling set of suggestions for proper sequencing of fiscal and monetary policy exit strategies is proposed 
by von Hagen, et.al (2009).  The authors propose to begin from fiscal consolidation, followed by monetary 
tightening only when inflation expectations arise and pose a danger to growth and financial stability.  In spite of 
the validity of this sequence, one may observe that there are wide-spread preferences for a reverse sequencing of 
monetary tightening followed by fiscal consolidation, due to prolonged unemployment effects in crisis-affected 
countries and the continuous needs for fiscal stimuli.     26
the three largest new EU members – Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary; the two largest 
eurozone members – Germany and France; and two incumbent members who pursue 
autonomous monetary policies – U.K. and Sweden. These countries’ scores are compared 
with those of the United States, which is used as a benchmark.  To capture the volatility time 
pattern and prevalence of tail risks, the GARCH-M-GED volatility dynamics analysis is 
employed. The inclusion of GED parameterization allows for estimating the degree of 
leptokurtosis.   
 
Financial market variables in the selected countries exhibit large volatility outbursts, 
particularly at times of financial distress. The empirical tests reveal this endemic leptokurtosis 
in the conditional volatility patterns of all variables.  Volatility outbursts of exchange rates 
seem to lag behind the respective volatility shocks for equity market indexes and interbank 
rates. The main finding of this study is that tail risks of interbank rates in the financial crisis 
were more pronounced than the tail risks of exchange rates and equity market indexes. The 
extreme risks of interbank rates are the most significant for Hungary, Poland as well as the 
United States, which may be attributable to their weaker macroeconomic policy discipline. 
This effect also implies that resiliency of the banking sectors in these countries against 
episodes of global credit crunch needs to be reinforced.  The financial crisis exacerbated tail 
risks of interbank rates for all banking systems with the exception of the eurozone, Hungary 
and the U.S.  
 
Leptokurtosis in the conditional volatility of equity market indexes is most 
pronounced for the Czech Republic, Poland and the United Kingdom – all of which follow 
highly autonomous monetary policies based on inflation targeting with flexible exchange 
rates. A significant increase in tail risks of equity markets during the financial crisis sub-
period is detected for Germany, Hungary and Poland, but not for the remaining markets.  In a 
similar vein, tail risks of domestic currency values of the euro are the most significant for the 
new EU member countries.  In hindsight, financial markets of the new EU members remain to 
be highly vulnerable to large, unpredictable shocks stemming from global financial crises, 
implying that their sufficient institutional resiliency is yet to be developed.  The findings of 
the prevalence of tail risks of financial market variables would be useful for developing 
monetary and macroprudential policies aimed at mitigating these risks. 
 
  Proper policies for abating tail risks still remain in a developmental stage.  However, 
some useful policy actions can already be identified.  Policies aimed at abating tail risks 
should have two distinctive characteristics: counter-cyclicality and flexibility. In my opinion, 
flexible monetary policy based on a dual mandate of price stability and financial stability, 
coupled with macroprudential regulations can be effective for mitigating these risks.  For this 
purpose, I advocate a monetary policy regime based on flexible, forward looking inflation 
targeting that entails ‘leaning’ against anticipated credit bubbles. In terms of counter-cyclical 
macroprudential policies that are plausible for mitigating tail risks, I endorse flexible 
treatment of capital adequacy ratios for financial institutions as well as adopting contingent 
capital requirements.  On the micro-level, I support regulating derivative instruments, 
specifically, subjecting trades in complex derivatives to central clearing. Such policy actions 
could be effective for both alleviating tail risks and abating systemic risk.  For this reason, 
they deserve further consideration and development.  
   27
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